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1. Introduction 
 
Are the laws of nature consistent with contingency about what happens in the world? That depends 
on what the laws of nature actually are, but it also depends on what they are like. This latter is our 
concern here. Different philosophic views give different accounts of the sort of thing a law of nature 
is. We shall look at three that are widely endorsed: ‘Humean’ regularity accounts, laws as relations 
among universals, and disposition/powers accounts. Our question is, given an account of what laws 
are, what follows about how much contingency, and of what kinds, laws allow? 
 
Of the three types we shall look at, powers stand out as especially apt for admitting contingency, or 
so it would appear from conversations we've been engaged in, both with powers advocates and with 
powers opponents. Our investigation here suggests that this is not so. A powers account of laws 
may admit contingency but it need not. Conversely, the other accounts may rule out contingency 
but they need not. In all three cases, we shall argue, the root idea of what laws are does not settle 
the issue of whether they allow contingency. Advocates of the different accounts may argue for one 
view or another on the issue, but (at least as we understand the accounts) this will be an add-on 
rather than a consequence of the basic view about what laws are. 
 
Here we explore the possibility of various kinds of contingency in nature, contingency despite the 
pockets of rough order we observe in our daily lives and of precise order we report in our modern 
sciences. But, are contingency and order not obviously in opposition? Yes, we think they are… if a 
picture of nature dominant since the Scientific Revolution is correct, that order arises from the rule 
of universal deterministic laws, laws that hold everywhere and everywhen and that cover all aspects 
of what happens. But, we shall argue, that picture is not dictated by any of the three kinds of 
accounts of laws we investigate. Contingency and order are not in conflict on a ‘Humean’ regularity 
view of laws, as we describe in Section 2. They are also not in conflict if the source of order in 
nature is relations among universals, as we discuss in Section 3, nor if it is powers and dispositions, 
neither on Alexander Bird's version nor on that of Nancy Cartwright and John Pemberton. 
Cartwright and Pemberton argue from how much of modern science works; Bird, by contrast, 
approaches the issue with the questions and perspectives of metaphysics. We shall briefly review 
his account in Section 4a; in 4b Cartwright, following consultation with Pemberton, develops 
various ways in which contingencies are possible on the view of powers (which they call 
’capacities’) they advance.  
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We shall assume for this discussion that whatever laws of nature are, they are the kinds of things 
that our current best science might be representing – not that our current science has it right but that 
we don’t want our philosophic doctrines about what kinds of things laws of nature are to rule out 
that the world is pretty much as current best science pictures it.  In particular, then, we want to 
admit that candidate accounts of what laws of nature are should allow at least this: whether a 
radioactive atom decays in some given period of time is contingent, though the probability of this 
happening is not.  
 
Clarifying the question. Whether contingency is possible given the laws of nature depends not only 
on what kinds of things laws of nature are but also on what contingency consists in.  We distinguish 
several different questions one might ask in asking 'Do the laws of nature allow for contingencies in 
nature?'
1
 To be as neutral as possible we shall talk of laws covering a happening P if they, along 
perhaps with what the view of laws on offer counts as the 'right' kind of facts (boundary conditions, 
initial conditions, facts about the past, etc.), say that P will happen (as is typical with common 
accounts of deterministic laws) or that it is allowed to happen (as with common accounts of 
probabilistic laws). Using L to label the complete set of correct laws and P0(L,P) for the additional 
facts that bring L to bear on P, here are the questions we want to keep sorted from one another. 
 
Extent. Is everything that happens covered by L? For instance, there may be happenings, or 
kinds of happenings, or whole domains about which L is silent. 
Permissiveness. When L speaks about the outcomes that are to occur, what kind of latitude 
does it admit? For instance, does it always select a single happening? Does it always lay 
down at least a probability, or can L admit a set of different outcomes, remaining silent 
about their probabilities?
2
 
Reliability. Does what L (plus some relevant P0(L,P)) says is to happen always happen? For 
instance, can there be exceptions to L and yet L still be the correct and complete set of laws? 
 Potency. Do the things that L speaks about happen on account of L? Or, for instance, 
merely in accord with L? 
                                                 
1
We should note that we are not concerned with what the actual laws allow but rather with what laws allow by virtue of 
the kinds of things they are. It may be, for instance, that a particular account allows that laws may be either determinis-
tic or probabilistic but that the actual laws are all deterministic. 
2
 We propose treating laws that say 'anything goes' in some circumstance as not covering that circumstance and thus 
limited in extent.  
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Free will. If P, which happens, is an action of a person, is ~P consistent with P0(L,P) 
(whatever might be the appropriate P0(L,P)) obtaining and L being the correct and complete 
set of laws? 
 
We introduce the last question because it hovers in the background. Indeed it is one of the things 
that motivated the thinking behind this paper: Merlussi is otherwise writing on the consequence 
argument in metaphysics (to be discussed in Section 2), which begins with a version of determinism 
to argue to the conclusion that nobody ever could have done anything to make P false, for any P 
that describes human actions; and it is often suggested in conversation with Cartwright and 
Pemberton that a capacities account of laws like theirs leaves more room for free will than other 
accounts. Free will is, we all know, a huge question to which over millennia an enormous amount 
of intense thought has been dedicated, involving of course debate over the very formulation of the 
problem. Still, we think there are some simple observations we can make about how some accounts 
of laws of nature bear on the aspect of the question we formulate here. 
 
We will not always have much to say about every question with respect to each view of laws we 
survey but rather focus on what might not be altogether obvious or on where interesting differences 
lie. We will not address potency seriously at all. It is generally supposed – though not without 
objections – that universals and powers accounts allow for potency, as well as accounts that involve 
‘necessary’ regularities, whereas ‘Humean’ regularity accounts do not. We shall not take up this 
issue because we have nothing useful to add.  We list it for completeness and to make clear that it is 
a separate issue from the others. 
 
There are two guiding ideas we rely on throughout in considering extent and permissiveness. The 
idea for extent is simple: There may be situations where the laws are silent; they simply do not 
cover those situations. This is an issue, we claim, that is orthogonal to questions about whether laws 
are permissive when they do speak. For instance, L may be deterministic in the sense that for each 
appropriate P0(L,P), L admits one and only one P to occur, yet limited in extent because some real 
situations are not P0(L,P)-type situations for any admissible P0(L,P), i.e. some situations may not 
fall into any of the categories for the additional facts that bring L to bear. 
 
With respect to extent, a little simple housekeeping is necessary since some of the discussion in 
both the philosophy of science and the philosophy of religion literature as well as in the related 
metaphysics literature is confusing (at least to us) because it does not make clear the formulations at 
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stake to begin with, especially with respect to the quantifiers and what they range over. Consider 
the claim G': ‘Politeness requires giving an expensive gift to one’s teacher/mentor’, that we suppose 
is true in some cultures influenced by Confucianism. Shall we say it is limited in extent, or shall we 
rather consider G: 'In cultures A,B,C, politeness requires giving an expensive gift to one’s 
teacher/mentor’, which is, we suppose, true everywhere and in that sense not limited in extent? 
Similarly Cartwright
 
(1989, 2009, 2010) has suggested that what we think of as the usual laws of 
physics L' may well be limited in extent in a very specific way: They may be unable to represent all 
the possible causes of the effects they represent; their truth may then be restricted to just those cases 
where only causes they can represent are at work. Thus, it should more perspicuously be formulated 
something like this. L: 'So long as all of the causes of the consequences represented in L' are 
features represented in the antecedents of L', then L'.' One could think of formulating the issue in 
terms of domain restrictions: Are these restrictions included in the laws themselves or not? The 
problem is that it can be difficult to formulate criteria for what counts as a restriction on the domain 
of a law versus what counts as a feature that it genuinely covers. This is why we formulate the issue 
as we do: Are there things that happen that the complete and correct set of laws does not cover?  
 
As to permissiveness, although we turn to capacities last, it is useful to foreshadow one of the topics 
discussed there because it will help with understanding our remarks about permissiveness 
throughout. Cartwright has long urged that some events, even ones in the purview of laws, may just 
happen - by hap - without even any probabilities assigned by nature. An ear-ring back is stuck in 
some debris in the crack between the floorboards. You try to lift it with a magnet. The magnet pulls 
upward on the metal object with a fixed strength and gravity pulls it down with a fixed strength. 
These activities are both properly treated as sources of forces, where by 'properly' she means that 
there is a general way to ascribe forces for both. There is a magnet and there is a rule in physics for 
what forces magnets exert; and there is a large mass – the earth – and there is a rule for what force a 
mass exerts. There is also debris that inhibits the motion of the ear-ring back. Maybe there is 
another description of this particular debris for which there is a proper rule in physics that assigns a 
force. But certainly not under the description ‘debris’. And maybe there is no other such 
description. We may grant that some causes of motion are forces in the proper sense of that concept 
but that does not imply that all are. To assume there must be because the debris can affect the 
motion of the ear-ring back is to make a massive metaphysical assumption beyond the empirical 
evidence, Cartwright (2000, 2010) argues.  
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If we leave the issue open, then a new possibility for contingency arises. There is a rule for what 
force is exerted when the magnet and the earth act together in this arrangement, and on this rule 
only one resultant force is allowed. But what about the motion of the ear-ring back? Is there a rule 
that says what one motion will happen in this arrangement when the resultant force of the earth and 
the magnet acts on the ear-ring back simultaneously with the inhibiting power of the debris, or if 
not a rule dictating one single outcome, is there a rule that dictates a set of outcomes with a 
probability measure over them?  
 
We have insufficient reason to assume there is, Cartwright has argued, so that assumption should 
not be forced by our account of what laws are; the account should leave the question open. Yet 
surely there is some kind of rule since we have what do seem well-warranted beliefs that the ear-
ring back will not fly away at near the speed of light, and also, as Keith Ward
3
 has pressed, that it 
will not turn into a pumpkin. This is very underexplored territory. But it seems that here may lie yet 
another source of contingency; we have labelled this permissiveness: When L applies, given a 
relevant input P0(L,P), L might admit only one outcome, in which case L is not permissive. On the 
other hand, L may be permissive in that L admits a set that includes more than one outcome, and in 
the latter case, L may or may not provide a probability over that set.
4
  
 
2. The ‘Humean’ regularity account  
 
The central motivating idea behind what we shall call the ‘Humean’ regularity account of laws is 
not about laws but about the make-up of the world. The facts that constitute the world involve only 
qualities, quantities, and relations that are occurent, where ‘occurent’ means different things to 
different philosophers who call themselves ‘Humeans’. What they all have in common is that they 
want to exclude any kind of ‘modal’ features. There are no causings, no necessitatings, no doings, 
no making-things-happen-ings.  
 
In answer to the question ‘What is it to be a law of nature?’ the naïve ‘Humean’ account states that 
laws are regular associations among occurent features. But this is thought to be problematic. There 
are true accidental regularities that are not laws, it is supposed. To use Hans Reichenbach’s 
memorable example (1947: 368), ‘All gold spheres are less than a mile in diameter’ is a genuine 
                                                 
3
 Personal conversation with respect to the forthcoming volume Rethinking Order: After the Laws of Nature, (eds) N 
Cartwright & K Ward, London: Bloomsbury.  
4
 Clearly this supposes some already given way to individuate outcomes. 
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regular association, but this does not seem to be a law. So, it is commonly assumed, a satisfactory 
‘Humean’ view of laws should distinguish laws from accidental regularities. This is what David 
Lewis’s best system account (BSA) sets out to do (Lewis, 1973). Since BSA is very well developed 
and widely adopted, we shall focus on this version of the ‘Humean’ regularity account. However, 
the main arguments we put forward should go through for any acceptable ‘Humean’ account of 
lawhood, including Craig Callender and Jonathan Cohen’s (2009) ‘Better Best Systems Account’. 
 
In Counterfactuals (1973: 73) and ‘Humean Supervenience Debugged’ (1994: 478), Lewis takes as 
a starting point a short note written by Frank Ramsey in 1928. Lewis’s restatement of Ramsey’s 
passage asserts that ‘a contingent generalization is a law of nature if and only if it appears as a 
theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that achieves a best combination of 
simplicity and strength’ (Lewis 1973: 73).5 6  
  
Notice two important features of this view. First, laws supervene on the particular matters of fact. 
This is so because laws merely summarize facts. So, as to potency, laws do not ‘govern’ the world, 
they are just special regularities that encompass a good many other regularities. The particular 
matters of fact determine the laws of nature in the sense that if the laws of nature are different, 
that’s because the facts are different. Because of this, the BSA preserves the alleged intuition that 
the laws of nature are metaphysically contingent, at least so long as it is metaphysically contingent 
what the facts are. 
 
Given this brief description we can look at how the BSA deals with questions of whether L is 
compatible with contingencies.  
 
Extent. Does L cover everything that happens? Following John Earman, one might formulate the 
question as follows: Do laws have an unrestricted range in space and time? (Earman 1978: 174). As 
Earman points out, to deny that laws have an unrestricted range in space and time boils down to 
saying that there is ‘a region of space-time Ro such that, as far as L is concerned, “anything goes” in 
                                                 
5
 This looks like a use/mention confusion but it is almost certainly harmless. We shall try to avoid confusing the two but 
occasionally for ease of expression we will follow Lewis in talking in the formal mode when the claim is really one in 
the material mode. 
6
 Here’s what this means: Consider a true deductive system in which the general claims that represent laws of nature 
appear as a set of true sentences T that is deductively closed and whose non-logical vocabulary contains only predicates 
that express occurent properties. There are many ways systems can be axiomatized. If the axioms of T preclude more 
possibilities than T’, then T is stronger than T’. Likewise, some true deductive systems can be axiomatized more simply 
than others, in the sense that they have fewer axioms. The general claims representing the laws of nature will belong to 
all the axiom systems with a best combination of these two virtues, simplicity and strength.  
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Ro.’ (Earman 1978: 174).
7
  More precisely, where M denotes the set of all models of the putative 
law sentences, this may be formulated as the question of whether claims representing the complete 
and correct set of laws L satisfies the following condition:  
 
(U) There is no non-empty, proper subregion R0 of space-time such that for any M ∈ M, 
there is an M’∈ M  where M’⊨ L and M’|Ro  ≈ M|Ro.   
 
This condition states that L is valid on a model that is not restricted to some spatio-temporal region, 
that is, L is ‘universal’. Given the BSA there is motivation for thinking that the laws of nature 
should be ‘universal’. If the range of the axioms (or theorems) of the best deductive systems were 
limited to some spatio-temporal region, then one would expect more axioms to summarize the 
whole history of the world. That is, one would need more axioms to cover all spatio-temporal 
regions. But if the range of the axioms is not limited, then one can naturally expect fewer axioms to 
summarize all the particular matters of fact. Furthermore, this will not reduce the system’s 
informativeness, since the axioms now are not restricted to some spatio-temporal region. On the 
other hand, if nature is fairly unruly outside a given range, adding piecemeal information about 
what happens there to any set of axioms may increase informativeness at too great a cost to 
simplicity. So the laws may be limited in extent. Despite the fact that the BSA explains why we 
might expect the laws of nature to be universal, it seems that Earman is right in saying that there is 
no a priori guarantee that the laws of nature according to the BSA will satisfy (U) (Earman 1978: 
180).  
 
 Permissiveness. Within its domain, under the BSA, does the correct L (plus relevant initial or 
boundary conditions) always single out a unique outcome?  In order to answer this question one 
needs to bear in mind the main motivation behind Humeanism about laws. The world is void of 
modalities – no causings, no necessitatings, no probabilifyings; the world is nothing but a mosaic of 
occurent events. Laws summarize what happens in this mosaic, rather than ‘governing’ what the 
particular matters of fact are.  
 
                                                 
7
 We use this formulation because readers may be familiar with it. But there is no reason to assume that nature thinks in 
terms of space-time regions rather than, as in Cartwright’s view, in terms of what features obtain. For instance, as we 
noted, her rendering of boundaries on the range of a theory T is roughly this: Those instances of effect E that T covers 
are the instances for which some or all of the causes of E fall under concepts available in T.   
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If L is deterministic, given an appropriate P0(L,P), L admits only one outcome. But there is nothing 
in the Humean motivation that makes determinism natural. The best summary may be provided by 
purely probabilistic laws or by laws that constrain outcomes to a given set but do not choose among 
them nor lay a probability over them.  As Helen Beebee points out (Beebee, 2000: 575) whether the 
world is best axiomatized under deterministic laws depends on how regular the world is. The world 
can be modality free and still irregular enough to be summarized best by non-deterministic laws.  
 
Reliability. So as not to muddle together issues of extent, permissiveness, and reliability, let’s 
consider the most difficult case for contingency in the reliability sense: where the laws have 
universal extent and are deterministic, allowing only one output for any relevant input. It looks at 
first sight as if in this case on the BSA, they must be reliable. There can be no exceptions to the 
correct laws. We think, however, that there is still some wiggle room and will offer two ways that 
might be thought sympathetic to the ‘Humean’ viewpoint that might allow for exceptions, one of 
which is due to Lewis himself. For the sake of this discussion we propose to adapt Earman’s 
definition of determinism in terms of possible worlds to define deterministic laws because it makes 
for a ready connection to the Lewis wiggle. 
  
Let L stand for ‘L is the correct set of laws’, then define ‘deterministic’ thus: 
 
Laws L are deterministic iff for any P that L covers and any P0(L,P) that is ‘appropriate’ 
input to L for P and any logically possible worlds w, w’ in which L,  if w and w' agree on 
P0(L,P), they agree on whether P obtains. 
 
An interesting way to address the question of the reliability of deterministic laws under the BSA is 
by considering Scott Sehon’s objection (2011) to the standard definition of determinism. First, we 
start by pointing out that  
 
D: If L and L is deterministic then for any P that occurs and that L covers and any P0(L,P) 
that occurs that is an appropriate boundary/initial condition for P with respect to L, 
□((P0(L,P) & L)  P). 
 
To see why, suppose that L is deterministic and P0(L,P) is an appropriate boundary/initial condition 
for P with respect to L and P. Let W stand for the collection of all possible worlds. Consider an 
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arbitrary world w in W where P0(L,P) and L. Because L is deterministic, if P obtains in any world 
where L and P0(L,P) obtain, it holds in all worlds where P0(L,P) and L obtain, including w. P 
obtains in our (the actual) world where L and P0(L,P) obtain. So P obtains in w and thus (P0(L,P) & 
L)  P in w. Since w is any arbitrary possible world, □((P0(L,P) & L)  P) follows. 
 
Sehon, however, thinks that this is problematic. He argues that L and P0(L,P) should allow 
exceptions. Even if the correct laws are deterministic, Sehon claims, it should be logically possible 
that there is, for example, an interventionist God (IG) that could miraculously change water into 
wine (Sehon, 2011: 31). As Sehon says, ‘necessarily, if an IG exists, then it is possible that the same 
initial state of affairs obtains, along with the same laws of nature, and yet P is false’ – i.e it is 
possible that P0(L,P)&L&~P (2011:31). His reasoning can be spelled out as follows (using IG to 
stand for ‘There is an interventionist God’): 
 
1.  □(IG(P0(L,P)&L&~P))  Premise 
2.  IG     Premise 
3.  (P0(L,P)&L&~P)   From 1&2, assuming S4 
4.  ~□((P0(L,P)&L)P)   From 3 
 
And (4), clearly, is the contradictory of □((P0(L,P) & L)   P), which follows from the assumption 
that L is deterministic.  
 
Note that Sehon’s main point does not depend on the premise that an IG is logically possible. One 
might try to cast Sehon’s objection as a call for a domain restriction: L holds everywhere that there 
is no interventionist God (L holds if ~IG). ‘Humeans’ might not like this because there is no way 
that the domain restriction could be brought into the antecedents in the laws of nature since laws are 
supposed to involve only occurent features, and God’s intervening does not seem a good candidate 
for an occurent feature on any ‘Humean’ account of ‘occurent’ we know. That aside, the problem is 
that determinism would be incompatible, say, with the logical possibility of an interventionist 
demon, in the sense that, necessarily, if an interventionist demon exists, then it is possible that 
P0(L,P)&L&~IG&~P. So, Sehon’s main worry is not about the logical possibility of an IG, nor 
about the logical possibility of a demon in particular. It is about the logical possibility of the laws of 
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nature being violated.
8
 Thus, Sehon urges, exceptions to what L (and P0(L,P)) say should happen 
should be possible even if determinism is true, precisely because it must be logically possible to 
violate the laws. And if the BSA does not accommodate that, there must be something wrong with 
the BSA as an account of laws.  
 
In what follows, we will show how a Lewisian might reply to this argument, showing that the BSA 
may be consistent with assuming that the correct laws are deterministic and yet can be violated, at 
least in a sense. The task then is to show that these two propositions are consistent:  
 
p: The correct laws L are deterministic. 
q: It is possible to violate (the correct laws) L. 
 
The first strategy is to hedge on p, using Lewis’s own notion of soft determinism, which is 
supposed to allow a sense in which agents are able to do things such that, if they were to do them, 
what L says happens does not happen. (Lewis 1981: 114). 
 
Let us assume the truth of p and thus of D, so that some statement about the distant past, P0(L,P) , 
and L logically imply, for instance, P: ‘Agent A did not raise her hand’. What if A had raised her 
hand? There are three options: 
 
1. If A had raised her hand, contradictions would have been true. 
2. If A had raised her hand, P0(L,P) would be false.  
3. If A had raised her hand, L would be false.  
  
Someone like Lewis will naturally reject option 1. Even if the agent had raised her hand, 
contradictions would not have been true. Lewis also denies 2. Even if the agent had raised her hand, 
the past would still be the same, so P0(L,P) would still be true (Lewis 1979). Thus, if we want to say 
that the correct set of laws L is deterministic and sometimes we are able to act otherwise, the only 
option remaining consistent with Lewis’s viewpoint is 3. Thus, given P0(L,P) and D, ~P implies L is 
false. Yet, we are supposed to be arguing that L are the correct laws. How is that possible? 
Following Lewis the clue is: correct in what worlds? 
                                                 
8
 A domain restriction in this case seems to make law claims tautological, which they should not be for the Humean: 
‘As are regularly associated with Bs except when they aren’t.’ 
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To see how this works we need to draw a distinction between two senses in which one can violate a 
law:  
 
Weak sense: An agent is able to do something such that, if she were to do it, a law would be 
violated, either a law of the actual world or a law of nearest possible worlds.  
Strong sense: An agent is able to do something such that, if she were to do it, a law would 
be violated and this law would be of the actual world.  
 
For example, in the weak sense, if the agent were to have raised her hand (i.e. we assume she did 
indeed raise her hand in the actual world), contrary to what L says, then L would have been violated 
before the hand raising. To use Lewis’s phrase, a ‘divergence miracle’ would have happened before 
that, that is, there would be a violation of the laws of nature that hold at our actual world, and this 
violation would not be caused by A’s action. Note that to say that there is a violation of the laws of 
nature in the weak sense is not to say that the violated laws are the laws of the same world where 
they are violated. The term ‘miracle’ is used to express a relation between different possible worlds. 
As Lewis says, ‘a miracle at w1, relative to w0, is a violation at w1 of the laws of w0, which are at 
best the almost-laws of w1’(Lewis 1979: 469). So with a divergent miracle in our actual world, 
whose laws are the ‘almost’ laws of a nearest world where L is not violated, we can violate the 
correct laws of that nearby world. Or vice versa. Now, if by ‘violating a law’ we mean the weak 
sense where what we violate is an ‘almost law’, not a real law, of our world, then it seems agents 
may be able to violate laws that are deterministic.  
 
But what if by ‘violating the laws of nature’ Sehon means the strong sense? The strong sense is the 
one in which the laws that are violated in the actual world are the laws of the actual world. This 
seems what Sehon has in mind when he says that, if IG, then it is possible that we have the same 
laws, the same past, and yet P is false. However, if by ‘violating a law’ Sehon means the strong 
sense, then someone like Lewis will deny that it is logically possible to violate a law in the strong 
sense. This is so because, as Lewis says, ‘any genuine law is at least an absolutely unbroken 
regularity’ (Lewis 1981: 114). Given the BSA, it is clear why we cannot violate laws in the strong 
sense. Suppose it is a law that no object moves faster than light. If someone were to throw an object 
that moves faster than light, then that law would not be true. Since Lewis’s ‘Humean’ laws are true 
regularities, if it is a fact that a certain stone moves faster than light, then it cannot be a true 
regularity that no objects travel faster than light.  
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‘Humeans’ might however, consistent with the commitment that there are only the occurent facts of 
which laws are summaries, take a more instrumentalist line. The best summaries may not be 
required to be true, especially if this brings about a big gain in simplicity. They could admit of 
exceptions but be right most of the time. Or they could be wrong most all the time yet still very 
nearly right most, even all, the time. This is like William Wimsatt’s view (1992) that laws could be 
templates that fit widely but in many cases not exactly. Whether admitting false claims as the 
correct laws is a good idea on the ‘Humean’ view depends on what the world is really like. 
Cartwright (1983) has argued that high level laws in physics often get fitted to the real details of 
real situations only by adding ad hoc corrections. That could be because we have just missed out on 
the factors that support those corrections and that bring the situation genuinely under the laws. But 
it could be that that is just what the world is like. There is no single uniform pattern but only a 
template which fits widely but not very exactly. If the latter is the case, the BSA can be maintained 
while allowing contingency in the reliability sense, so long as the demand is given up that the best 
summary of the facts be true.
9
 
 
Potency. Do the things that L speaks about happen on account of L? Or, for instance, merely in 
accord with L? Perhaps this is the least problematic question to answer according to the BSA. 
Clearly, the things that L speaks about happen merely in accord with L.  
 
Free will. The question whether the ‘Humean’ account of laws plus assumption D, which follows 
from the hypothesis that the correct laws are deterministic, is compatible with the possibility of 
agents doing other than what they do, can be introduced in the context of the currently central 
argument for incompatibilism,
10
 namely the consequence argument.
11
 One of the crucial premises 
of the consequence argument is that the laws of nature are not up to anyone. The modal formulation 
makes use of a modal sentential operator ‘■’ in which ‘■P’ abbreviates ‘P and no one has or ever 
had any choice about whether P’. ‘■’ is supposed to satisfy these two inference rules: 
(α) □P ⊢  ■P 
(β) ■(P  Q), ■P ⊢  ■Q 
 
                                                 
9
 Here it is easy to make things look simpler than they are by blurring use/mention distinctions. If laws are ‘false’ but 
‘nearly true’ then the laws will not be facts as we first claimed for BSA but rather only very similar to facts.  
10
 Incompatibilism here understood is the view that if determinism is true, there’s no free will.  
11
 Cf. Carl Ginet (1983) and Peter van Inwagen (1983). The Consequence Argument is so-called because it relies on the 
consequences of the laws of nature and the past in order to establish incompatibilism.   
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Here is the consequence argument, supposing that L are the correct laws, the correct laws are true, P 
is something that happens and P0(L,P) is the relevant feature to fix P given L: 
1. □ ((P0(L,P) & L)  P)   from determinism  
2. □ (P0(L,P)   (L  P))   from 1 
3. ■ (P0(L,P)   (L P))   from 2 and rule (α) 
4. ■P0 (L,P)      premise, fixity of past 
5. ■(L  P)     from 3, 4 and rule (β) 
6. ■L      premise, fixity of laws of nature 
7. ■P      from 5, 6, and rule (β) 
 
Is premise (6) true? One might interpret the ‘■’ operator in a more precise way as follows (Pruss, 
2013): 
 
(■-def.): ■P if and only if P & ∼∃ x ∃ α [Can(x, α) & (Does (x, α) □→ ∼P)] 
 
where ‘□→’ stands for the counterfactual conditional, x ranges over agents, and α ranges over all 
past, present and future action types.  
 
The idea is that there is nothing that anyone can do such that if they were to do it P would be false. 
Now, is ‘■L’ true according to this interpretation? As the interpretation above makes explicit use of 
a counterfactual conditional, and since we are interested in seeing how the ‘Humean’ might answer 
this question, the natural way to proceed is to use an account of counterfactuals that is in line with 
the BSA. So we will presuppose Lewis’s own semantics. At a first approximation, let us say that  
 
(C-L): A □→ B is (non-vacuously) true in a world w iff B is true in all the worlds in which 
A is true that are closest to w. 
 
Given (■-def.), if ‘■L’ is false, then some agent s is able to perform an action a such that, if s were 
to perform a, then L would be false. To put it in a different way, is L true in all the closest worlds in 
which P: Agent s does action a? Suppose ~P, that s does not perform a in the actual world w0. Now, 
suppose worlds in which s performs a have the same laws as the actual w0 and these laws are 
deterministic. Can we consider these worlds to be the closest relative to w0 among the worlds where 
s performs a? Since worlds in which s performs a do not agree on P they cannot agree on any 
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P0(L,P) that with L determines P nor on any R(L,P0(L,P)) that with L determines P0(L,P), and so 
forth. Now L – the set of complete and correct laws of our world – may be very limited in extent. 
Perhaps they only cover P, in which case the only fact besides P on which these worlds disagree 
with the actual is P0(L,P). But this won’t work if they are to account in the way we usually expect 
for the amount of order we see in the world. For instance, what about all the knock-on effects from 
all the initial or boundary conditions that are related under L to P? And the knock-on effects of the 
Rs that need to be different when all the laws in L are deterministic to ensure the P0s are? When so 
much divergence from the actual world, w0, occurs in these worlds, can these worlds be the closest 
worlds relative to w0 in which s does a? Following Lewis’s own manoeuvres in cases like this, the 
better option, it seems, is to regard as ‘closest’ those worlds that are just like w0 up to about the time 
that s performs a, and then diverge by a divergence miracle. Therefore, the closest worlds in which 
s performs a are not worlds in which the same laws L obtain. Therefore, the ‘Humean’ who follows 
Lewis has motivation for considering ‘■L’ false and, consequently, for rejecting premise 6 of the 
consequence argument.  
 
3. Laws as relations among universals 
Fred Dretske (1977), Michael Tooley (1987), and David Armstrong (1983) developed a rival 
approach to the BSA. In what follows our presentation will focus on Armstrong’s view. Laws of 
nature, according to Armstrong, are necessary relations among first-order universals. The 
ontological component of a law according to the BSA is a regularity; on Armstrong’s view, it is a 
second-order relation between first-order universals. Suppose that all F’s are G’s and that the laws 
of nature ensure this. F-ness and G-ness are taken to be first-order universals. Armstrong states that 
a second-order contingent relation holds between these two universals. He labels this relation as 
‘nomic necessitation’ and he uses ‘N’ to refer to it. Armstrong symbolizes the relation of 
necessitation between F and G as ‘N(F,G)’. He also claims that the holding of N entails the 
corresponding generalization. So,  the second order-relation N between the first order universals F 
and G,  ‘N(F,G)’, entails ‘All F’s are G’s’.  
 
On the traditional Armstrong/Tooley/Dretske view it seems that laws are reliable - what they say 
goes, goes. At least this is the case under the assumption at the core of the view
12
 that the relations 
that obtain between universals make true the corresponding relations between instantiations of those 
universals in the real world; what happens in the empirical world depends on and must be in accord 
with what relations hold among universals. This also ensures that laws are powerful -- things 
happen because they say so. So potency is assured as well. 
 
                                                 
12
 Though it has frequently been objected that it is hard to see how this assumption could be true (van Fraassen, 1989).  
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On extent, perhaps the issue is more open. Individual advocates may argue that laws govern all that 
happens. But that seems to be an add-on to the two assumptions that seem central to the account 
that, first, laws are relations between universals, and second, any instances of universals that figure 
in the laws must reflect in the appropriate way the relations among those universals. These do not 
by themselves imply that every feature that occurs in the world instances a universal that has such 
relations to others and hence the two do not seem to imply that everything that happens is in the 
purview of laws of nature. Even if one supposes that it makes no sense to think of features that do 
not fall under universals, there is still the issue of whether the associated universals all participate in 
the kinds of relations to one another that make for laws of nature. 
 
Permissiveness may also be more open on the laws-as-relations-among-universals view than it 
seems at first sight. For there may be more relations among universals than just the one – labelled 
‘N’ – that is the truth maker for the necessitation aspect of law claims. Some universals may be 
taller or more beautiful than others, which may be irrelevant to what happens in the world when 
these universals are instantiated. Even among world-guiding relations, necessitation may not be all 
there is. After all, the view presumably does not want to rule out that a probabilistic theory like 
quantum mechanics can be correct.  
 
One way to allow for this is to keep only N and then suppose that the universal represented by the 
quantum state is N-related to a universal that we represent by a probability measure. Instantiation of 
this last seems troublesome though; moreover probability itself, as van Fraassen 1980 argues, may 
best be seen as a modal notion. So, in keeping with the view that modalities reflect facts about 
universals and their relations, another idea for how to handle probabilistic laws is to assume there is 
another kind of modality beyond that responsible for necessity: 'probabilifies', with various ways to 
develop this idea further. Key though is that if the universal corresponding to A probabilifies the 
universal corresponding to quantity Q in accord with Prob (Q = q), then instances of A will be 
associated with instances of values of Q in a pattern reflecting Prob (Q = q).  
 
This leads readily to admitting permissiveness of the kind we see in the capacities account of laws. 
Once more world-guiding relations are admitted than N, there seems no good reason to suppose that 
an even weaker modal notion than 'probabilifies' may obtain, one that constrains the values Q may 
take when A is instantiated to a given set but which dictates no particular pattern to them. One or 
another in the set must be instantiated but which on any occasion is mere hap, with not even a nice 
probability-looking pattern to emerge in the long run. 
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This may, at first sight, seem counter to the universals account of laws. After all, wasn't the point to 
find some location for necessity? We think not. The point is to find a location for modality. 
Universals are introduced in order to enable laws to do a number of jobs. They are supposed to 
support counterfactuals, to explain why things happen in the orderly way they do, to justify our 
inductive practices. All this may require modality but other modalities than necessity can do the 
jobs required. How is it on this view that the laws of nature explain that All Fs are Gs and justify 
our inductive practice of predicting that the next F we encounter will be G on the basis of past 
observations that Fs are Gs? It is because the universal associated with F is N-related to that 
associated with G. But it is not the N-ness of the relation that matters; it is rather the two-fold fact 
that this relation holds between the universals in Platonic heaven, and whatever world-guiding 
relations occur in Platonic heaven must be reflected in the behavior of their instances in the 
empirical world. Other kinds of patterns in the world could then be equally explained and supported 
by other relations between universals, for instance 'F probabilifies Q=q to degree p', where the p 
values for Qs satisfy the probability calculus; or ‘F φ-necessitates Q’, which is reflected in the fact 
that Fs are always followed by some value or other of Q in φ. 
 
  
4a. Dispositions, a la Alexander Bird   
  
So far we have mainly focused on Lewis’s and Armstrong’s accounts. Although they can both be 
seen as figureheads for rival camps concerning the laws of nature, Alexander Bird (2005, 2007) 
interestingly notes that the accounts have two theses in common: they both take (i) laws of nature to 
be metaphysically contingent, and they both take (ii) properties to be categorical. Dispositional 
essentialism (DE) has emerged as an account of laws that explicitly rejects these two assumptions. 
First, according DE, the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, for reasons that we will see 
soon (though we shall have very little to say about what is supposed to be meant by ‘metaphysically 
necessary’). Second, DE takes at least some – maybe all – natural properties to be essentially 
dispositional. We will briefly discuss in this Section Alexander Bird’s version of DE for a concrete 
illustration. Similar results with respect to contingency hold for many other versions, making 
appropriate adjustments. 
 
First, Bird adopts the conditional analysis of dispositions (CA). Where D is a dispositional property, 
S(D) is a stimulus property appropriate to it and M(D) is its manifestation property, (CA) may be 
symbolized as follows: 
 
(CA) Dx ↔(S(D)x □→ M(D)x). 
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As Bird points out, (CA) does not merely provide an analysis of the concept D; instead, it 
characterizes the nature of the property D. Thus, as Bird says, (CA) is metaphysically necessary: 
(CA□) □M(Dx ↔ (S(D)x □→ M(D)x)). 
 
Second, DE endorses the view that at least some fundamental properties are essentially 
dispositional. To say that a property P is essentially dispositional is to say that, necessarily – in the 
metaphysical sense – to instantiate P is to possess a disposition D(P) to yield the appropriate 
manifestation in response to an appropriate stimulus: 
 
(DEP) □M(Px → D(P)x)  
 
Laws, for Bird, are metaphysically necessary regularities that supervene on dispositions.
13
 
They are metaphysically necessary in virtue of the conditional analysis of dispositions
14
 and the 
thesis that at least some natural properties have dispositional essences. Here’s how to see that:  
1. □M(P(D)x → (S(D)x □→ M(D)x))  from CA□ and DEP 
2. P(D)x & S(D)x    assumption 
3. M(D)x     from 1 and 2 
4. (P(D)x & S(D)x) → Mx   from 2-3 
 
Since one can generalize over the unbound variable x, we get from 4 
5. ∀x ((P(D)x & S(D)x) → M(D)x). 
 
Hence, a universal generalization follows from (CA□) and (DEP). Furthermore, since both 
(CA□) and (DEP) are metaphysically necessary, this generalization is metaphysically necessary as 
well. It looks then as if any laws underwritten by dispositional properties will be totally reliable, 
and on Bird’s view it seems that these are all the laws there. 
 
The problem with this, though, is that (CA) is often false, Bird notes, because of the 
existence of finkish dispositions and antidotes.
15
 However, he argues, rather than being a 
disadvantage for dispositionalism, this is one of its virtues, since the falsity of (CA) allows the 
dispositionalist to account for ceteris paribus laws. We can just replace the left-to-right implication 
of (CA) by  
                                                 
13
 Presumably it is not out of keeping with the basic motivations of DE to take them to be rather facts about the disposi-
tions themselves, as in the capacities account described in the next Section. 
14 Bird takes the conditional analysis as a necessary equivalence. 
15
 “An object’s disposition is finkish when the object loses the disposition after the occurrence of the stimulus but be-
fore the manifestation can occur and in such a way that consequently that manifestation does not occur” (Bird, 2007: 
25). See also Martin (1994) and Lewis (1997). Bird also points out that one cannot eliminate all counterexamples to 
(CA→) by excluding finks (Bird, 2007: 27). “Let object x possess disposition D(S,M). At a time t it receives stimulus S 
and so in the normal course of things, at some later time t’, x manifests M” (Bird, 2007: 27). An antidote or mask to 
D(S,M) is something that “has the effect of breaking the causal chain leading to M, so that M does not in fact occur” 
(Bird, 2007: 27) when applied before t’. See Bird (1998).  
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(CA→ *) Dx → (S(D)x & finks and antidotes to D are absent □→ M(D)x).  
 
Now we deduce the following regularity:  
∀x (finks and antidotes to D are absent → ((Dx & S(D)x) → M(D)x)).  
This is how the dispositionalist can account for ceteris paribus laws – supposing that in all 
correct ceteris paribus laws, the conditions that are referred to in the ceteris paribus clause 
genuinely are either finks or antidotes to the disposition referred to. Conditioning on the absence of 
finks and antidotes gets built right into the laws themselves. Reliability, it seems is thus restored, at 
least for ceteris paribus laws where all that is missing to render the ceteris paribus clause explicit is 
reference to finks or antidotes. Moreover, Bird also argues that there is a fundamental level of laws 
where no finks occur and where antidotes are very unlikely (Bird, 2007: 63). In that case, as above, 
reliability is assured by (CA), as already noted. 
 
What then about permissiveness? It seems that where they speak – which seems to be 
whenever a dispositional property obtains and there are no finks or antidotes to it – DE laws allow 
only one outcome, the manifestation associated with that disposition. So DE laws seem 
impermissive. On the other hand, there seems to be nothing in the basic motivations for this account 
that implies that the manifestation must be limited to a single choice rather than a set of choices, 
with or without a probability over them. So impermissivenes seems an add-on for DE laws, just as it 
is for laws when taken as relations among universals or on the BSA. 
 
Extent too seems to fare just the same as in the other two accounts so far surveyed, except 
perhaps limitations on extent are to be expected here, at least so far as the basics we have presented 
go. The issue is whether everything that happens is a manifestation of (some combination of) 
essentialist dispositions. Two ways they may not be are immediately evident. First, if not all 
properties are DE properties then DE laws that supervene on DE properties and their associated 
dispositions will not cover them
16
. Second, DE laws derived above are, as remarked, ceteris paribus 
laws, which cover only situations where no finks and antidotes obtain. What happens when these 
do? Or – more to the point, will finks and antidotes always be constituted by essentialist 
dispositional properties so that what happens when they obtain is then covered by the universal 
generalization that supervenes on the dispositions associated to those? If not, then DE laws won’t 
cover everything that happens. So DE laws may well be limited in extent.  
 
Recall though that Bird maintains that there is a level of fundamental dispositional 
properties that are not subject to finks and are seldom subject to antidotes. Does this imply that the 
correct set of laws covers all that happens? Supposing we substitute ‘never’ for ‘seldom’, the 
answer is ‘yes’, if a kind of total reductionism holds in which everything ultimately is covered by 
laws deriving from fundamental dispositional properties. But this kind of reductionism does not 
seem to follow from the basic motivating ideas of a DE account of laws. As with many of the other 
assumptions we have discussed, it is just an add-on.  
 
                                                 
16
 Some proponents of DE might, however, hold a mixed view according to which some fundamental properties are 
essentially dispositional and others are categorical, and so a DE law could connect a disposition with a categorical 
property. As a result, extent may be retained since laws won’t supervene only on DE properties. Thanks to the editors 
for pointing this out.  
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The real issue for extent then depends on two things. First, are all properties, including those 
that feature in finks and antidotes, essentially dispositional? And second, are all complexes of 
properties – like: ‘P(D) and the properties that characterize antidote A to P(D) and fink F to P(D)’ – 
themselves essentially dispositional properties and hence properties that give rise to laws that can 
cover every case? Suppose the answer to both is ‘yes’. Is that an add-on or rather a central part of 
the DE view? The answer here seems less clear than in many of the other cases we have considered 
and we won’t take a view. But if the answer is yes and this is not deemed an add-on, then DE laws 
will be, by their nature, universal in extent.  
 
What about reliability? Again let’s look at what seems to be the hardest case – where the 
laws are deterministic, which is where much of the current philosophy of religion and metaphysics 
literature focuses. As we saw before, if the correct laws L are deterministic, then □((P0(L,P) & L) → 
P).  
 
  This is true also for Bird’s account. But the main difference between Bird’s view and the 
BSA is how they reply to Sehon’s objection. If Sehon is right, then determinism should be 
compatible with ‘IG’ being logically possible. However, it should be noted that, in Sehon’s 
argument, he reads boxes and diamonds as logical necessity and possibility. Thus, his reasoning is 
only relevant if the box of □((P0(L,P) & L) → P) is read as logical necessity. It will be clearer if we 
present his reasoning again. Let ‘□L’ and ‘◊L’ respectively stand for logical necessity and 
possibility.   
1.  □L(IG(P0(L,P)&L&~P))  Premise 
2.  LIG     Premise 
3.  L(P0(L,P)&L&~P)   From 1&2, assuming S4 
4.  ~□L((P0(L,P)&L)P)   From 3 
 
As we can see, 4 implies the contradictory of □((P0(L,P) & L) → P) if the box is read as logical 
necessity.  
 
Now, if we take the initial or boundary conditions that feed into laws to be facts about the 
past, which is one typical choice for them, then Helen Beebee can help us think about the issue of 
logical necessity for ‘Humean’ views:  
For the Humean, the laws and the current facts determine the future facts in a purely logical 
way [our emphasis]: you can deduce future facts from current facts plus the laws. And this is 
just because laws are, in part, facts about the future’ (Beebee 2000: 578).  
 
So, if the BSA is correct, then it should follow from determinism that □L((P0(L,P) & L) → P), as 
indeed it does under the definition we adopted in Section 2. That is, according to the BSA, 
determinism is incompatible with ‘IG’ being logically possible as possibility is characterized by 
Sehon. 
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On the other hand, if DE is correct, then it seems that determinism could be compatible with 
‘IG’ being logically possible even as characterized by Sehon. This is so because the dispositionalist 
needs only one genuine notion of necessity that applies to issues about what happens in the world, 
which is metaphysical necessity (Bird 2007: 48). And metaphysical necessity is distinct from 
logical necessity. As a result, the box of □((P0(L,P) & L) → P) should be read as metaphysical 
necessity. Let ‘□M’ stand for metaphysical necessity. Now it is clear that 
 
 (L) ~□L((P0(L,P) & L) → P) 
and 
(M) □M((P0(L,P) & L) → P)  
 
are not explicitly contradictory. Someone might argue that (L) and (M) are implicitly contradictory. 
If logical possibility entails metaphysical possibility, then one gets the contradictory of (M); and 
then (L) and (M) are implicitly contradictory. Nevertheless, the dispositionalist has no motivation 
for accepting the premise that logical possibility entails metaphysical possibility. One might argue 
that we should expect a clear explanation of what metaphysical necessity is, since Bird’s account 
relies on it. This might be correct. However, it is not our aim in this paper to defend Bird’s view but 
rather to show the consequences of his view for our discussion. 
 
How though could DE reject the ‘logically necessary’ reading of the box in ((P0(L,P) & L) 
→ P) since we argued in Section 2 that that reading follows from the definition of determinism we 
adopt, which is not an unconventional one? It seems the trick would be to revise the definition of 
determinism so that it doesn’t involve logical necessity either but only metaphysical necessity, thus: 
 
Laws L are DE-deterministic iff for any P that L covers and any P0(L,P) that is ‘appropriate’ 
input to L for P and any metaphysically possible worlds w, w’ in which L,  if w and w' agree 
on P0(L,P), they agree on whether P obtains. 
 
This may indeed be a reasonable move for the DE advocate to make given the view that the only 
modalities that should play a role in these discussions about nature and its laws and possibilities are 
metaphysical ones. 
 
The second point concerns the question of free will. Lewis’s view gives motivation for 
rejecting one of the premises of the consequence argument, namely, the premise that the laws of 
nature are not up to anyone since laws of nature supervene on the facts and some facts may be up to 
agents. On the other hand, it seems that those sympathetic to DE should accept this premise because 
they should, it seems, accept not only rule alpha but the rule α’: 
 
(α’) □MP ⊢ ■P 
 
To see why, for DE, the laws of nature are not up to us then, remember that for the 
dispositionalist the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. Consequently, L is also 
metaphysically necessary. That is,  
1. □ML    
Given rule α’, from 1 we can derive  
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2. ■L.  
 
So, it does not really matter in this case how we interpret ‘■’. If rule α’ is valid, then proponents of 
DE should accept the premise that the laws of nature are not up to us.  
 
4.  Cartwright and Pemberton on capacities and arrangements 
 
Following the language of Cartwright (1989), we call the kinds of powers that Cartwright 
and Pemberton defend ‘capacities’. They do not use the term ‘manifestation’ since it would be 
ambiguous in their ontology. Capacities have a canonical way of acting, which is to be 
distinguished from what happens when they act. For each capacity, there is a prescribed set of ways 
in which it can act. When the capacity ‘gravity’ acts, it pulls, no matter what happens to the object 
on which it pulls. What actually happens depends on what other powers gravity cooperates with in 
the circumstances and what the arrangements are. When the arrangements are right, the activities of 
the powers give rise to regular behaviors, as in the orbits of the planets around the sun, or the 
browning of bread in a toaster, or the expulsion of magnetic fields in a superconductor. These kinds 
of arrangements are what Cartwright (1989) called ‘nomological machines’ and more recently are 
commonly called ‘mechanisms’. Whether there are contingencies in nature then depends on 
whether all arrangements that occur in nature are like nomological machines or mechanisms, where 
it has been supposed that a single kind of behavior is fixed, or whether the outcomes can sometimes 
be open, and if so, how this is possible on a capacities account of laws. 
 
To begin with, we must be careful how we think of activities. The conditional account of 
dispositions and powers has it that for each disposition D there is a (possibly empty) set of stimuli 
S(D) and an outcome M(D) such that D obtains just in case if some s(D) ϵ S(D) occurs, then M(D), 
where s and M represent occurent features. Still in the grip of this account, we can slip into thinking 
of the activity as an occurent feature like s(D) and M(D). This makes for puzzles when powers act 
in consort. The outcomes of each power separately then seem to be pictured as ‘really there’ as 
outcomes, though it seems they are often invisible. The visible, or occurent, outcome is the result of 
the powers acting jointly.  
 
The model here is bricks in a wall. Each brick is really there and so too is the wall. Some 
real cases can be fitted into this model, for instance where the outcomes can be represented with 
numbers that simply add up. We have the power to put $10 into the piggybank and you do too. 
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When we all act, the total outcome is $20 sitting there in the piggybank, $20 that is genuinely made 
up of our $10 and your $10. Perhaps it is not even too much of a stretch to fit forces into this model. 
When the gravitational capacity associated with mass M acts, it produces a force GMm/r
2 
on 
another mass m located
  
r from it; the Coulombic capacity associated with charge Q produces a 
force ϵQq/r2 on a charge q located r from it. When both act together, they add vectorially. Perhaps 
we could without too much stretch say that all three forces are really there and in the same sense, as 
with the bricks and the wall. 
 
But, as Cartwright has argued (2007), this is a poor model for other capacities acting in 
consort, like the capacities associated with parts of a circuit – conductors, resistors, impedances – 
producing a total current. Nature may assign each capacity its own role, a role that it has qua the 
capacity that it is; and nature may fix what happens when capacities act in consort in given 
circumstances. But nature need not do this via a simple model where each capacity separately 
produces its own canonical effect and what results overall just is all these separate effects piled up 
together.   
 
It is because they want to avoid any suggestion of this picture that Cartwright and 
Pemberton abandoned their former language of capacities, contributions, and rules of combination 
that determine outcomes in favor of capacities, exercisings or actings, and outcomes, following 
Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl Craver’s emphasis on activities (2000). A capacity acts 
in a canonical way, which is represented in various different ways in scientific theories in different 
domains, and when capacities act in consort in a particular arrangement, an outcome occurs. For 
Cartwright-Pemberton capacities, there is indeed a difference between the obtaining of a power and 
its exercise, as there should be, in defense against Hume who couldn’t these two distinct things in 
his ontology. But that does not make the exercising yet another occurent feature of the same kind as 
the resultant outcome. 
 
There is a second good reason for avoiding the language of contributions and how they 
combine. That makes it sound as if the capacity could act outside of any situation and the 
contribution is just what happens then. But capacities always act in some situation of other. We 
must not confuse the abstract description we give of a capacity, which allows us to figure out what 
will happen in various real situations, with a description of what it does in some strange situation-
less Platonic heaven. Perhaps we are sometimes led into this conflation by our conceptual model of 
the ideal experiment in which the capacity acts ‘entirely on its own’, from which we sometimes 
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read some canonical expression that we then use in making predictions about other circumstances, 
in accord with rules we have worked out about how to do this. But it is important to keep in mind 
that these idealized models picture concrete arrangements located in space and time, albeit ones that 
might never really occur. 
 
We emphasize this to underline the lesson that Pemberton stresses (2013): Arrangements 
matter. We may imagine two masses, M and m, located close together, m at r away from M, far 
away from anything else and also devoid of any other features, like charge, that are associated with 
a capacity to produce forces. Mass m would then experience a force very near to GMm/r
2
, which is 
just the canonical description we give of the capacity of gravitational attraction in order to compute 
by our rule of vector addition the force exerted on a massive object in more complex arrangements. 
That however is an arrangement, albeit one very special one that we have discovered gives us a 
convenient way to represent the capacity of gravity for use in studying other arrangements. It takes 
a combination of a capacity with its peculiar nature (that in the case of gravitational attraction
 
we 
represent by GMm/r
2
) and a given arrangement (like two objects both charged and massive being 
located close together and far away from all other objects) to fix what happens. This becomes 
important when we try to identify sources of contingency. 
 
What kinds of general facts are there that might get labelled ‘laws of nature’ on a capacities 
account? Three, it seems. First, what the nature of a power is. It is in the nature of the power of 
gravity to attract with a fixed strength. We represent this with the concept ‘the force of gravity’ and 
represent the strength of gravity associated with a body of mass M on m located r away by GM/r
2
. 
Second, depending on one’s metaphysics of properties, laws should include facts either about what 
powers co-occur or what properties bring with them what powers. For example, mass brings the 
power of gravity with it; or, if properties are just to be collections of powers, we could label as a 
law of nature the general fact that the power to attract gravitationally comes with the power to resist 
acceleration by a force. Third, laws should include general facts about what happens when powers 
act, either singly or in consort, in various arrangements. For instance (supposing that resultant 
forces and not just motions are really there), when the power of gravity vested in M acts in a 
situation where m is located r away and no other sources of force on m are present, then M exerts a 
force GMm/r
2
 on m. Or, in a situation where two powers we represent as forces act together on a 
body at a given point, then the body experiences at that point a force which is given by the vector 
sum of the canonical representations of the two powers.  
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With this in hand, we can look to sources of contingency. Begin with permissiveness. On a 
capacity account of laws, permissiveness can arise along three axes: in the nature of the capacities 
themselves; in the rules of combination when capacities act together; and in the effects of 
arrangement on what happens, though the last two will merge except in special cases. 
 
The nature of a capacity. We can think of capacities as having three different possible 
modes of acting. First, there is one and only one mode of action for the capacity. No permissiveness 
here. Second, there is a set of available ways of acting and a probability over these. The capacity 
must act in accord with these probabilities. Versions of the propensity theory of quantum 
probabilities fit here. Third, the capacity may have an available set of modes of acting but no 
constraints on how often it acts in which ways even in the long run. Both these last two can lead to 
contingency about what happens when the capacity acts in specific arrangements. 
 
Rules of combination. The familiar rule of vector addition fixes a single force that results in 
arrangements where two sources of force act together. But we can imagine permissive rules that 
allow a range of outcomes, either with or without a probability over them. Then what results would 
be contingent in the permissiveness sense. 
 
The effects of the arrangement. Of course the effects of the arrangement are already there in 
the rules of combination. But we hive this off as a different source of contingency to deal with cases 
where the rules of combination do not cover all aspects of a situation that are relevant to what 
happens. We are thinking here of cases where experience shows that a given arrangement gives rise 
to some constraints or other on joint outcomes but there are no known rules of combination to 
explain this.
17
 There is a general tendency in cases like this to think that the description of the 
situation is not detailed enough; when the details are filled in appropriately, there will be a general 
rule of combination to cover the case. That may – or may not – be so. The point is that there is 
nothing in the very notion of laws as facts about capacities and how they act in arrangements that 
precludes this source of contingency. 
 
Consider extent next. One may argue, as some do, that there is nothing but powers and their 
activities, in which case everything that happens must be the result of this. But just as with the other 
                                                 
17
 One might argue that where outcomes are constrained, there must be a rule of combination, albeit a very local one. 
That’s fine. We include this as a separate category to ensure attention is not focused entirely on well-established general 
rules of combination.  
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views of laws, this is an add-on to the basic account of what laws are for a capacities account and 
probably for most other powers accounts. Nothing about powers in themselves says they must rule 
everywhere and everything. 
 
As to reliability, the situation seems different. There seems no space in the capacity account 
to allow that things could happen within the domain of laws about capacities and about their joint 
outcomes that the powers-cum-arrangements do not allow. There seems to be no wiggle room on 
this account to allow that the laws of nature (which recall are about the natures of powers, what 
properties correlate with them, and how they are to act in various arrangements) could be as they 
are and yet for something about which they speak to occur contrary to what they say. Or at least we 
have not identified any such wiggle room. 
 
Free will. This does not imply however that agents could not have acted otherwise than as 
they did. After all, the laws could be permissive. Or the actions of agents could be outside their 
domain. If though we insist on the analogue of determinism and universal domain for capacities, 
then it seems that on a capacities account an agent could not, consistent with those being the correct 
laws, have done otherwise than what she did do. 
  
There is though an intermediate position even here. The laws for agents could be permissive 
consistent with those for non-agents being impermissive so long as only non-agents are involved. In 
that case, when agents and non-agents act together in certain arrangements, multiple outcomes 
could be available, including both, for example, that the agent raises her hand and that she does not. 
There will of course be trouble for this last alternative if it turns out that agents are just special 
arrangements of non-agents. 
 
5. Conclusion and an observation 
 
The observation is about our discussion of free will. For many, what we have discussed 
under this label is not only very cursory but also has little, even nothing, to do with free will 
because we have not touched on the ‘will’ part. Perhaps an agent could do differently from what she 
does but (and now the very form of this question itself is part of the serious enquiry) something 
like: ‘Can she do so because she wills it?’ Or, ‘Can she cause it to happen?’ After all, establishing 
that A’s actions could have been otherwise is a long way from showing that A is the author of her 
actions. Conversely, one venerable Christian tradition (Augustine, 1993) along with some modern 
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libertarian thought (Frankfurt 1969 and Mawson 2011) argues that being the author of one’s actions 
does not imply that one could have done otherwise. Perhaps authorship is where attention should be 
in the contemporary debate anyway and not, as much seems to be, on the compatibility of free will 
with determinism since it has been a long time since our best science has supposed that the laws of 
nature are all deterministic.  
 
At least we hope to have clarified that even if laws govern and in some sense ‘make things 
happen,’ there is nothing in the very nature of law in any of the senses surveyed that implies that 
things couldn’t happen other than the way they do consistent with the laws staying the same, nor 
even that probabilities need be fixed. Laws may be universal in extent and yet totally impermissive, 
and one may – or may not – have good independent arguments for these add-ons; but in all senses 
of ‘laws’ surveyed that is just what these are: add-ons. 
 
Conclusion: There are two surprises from this work, counter to our starting hypotheses. 
First, there are a number of different forms of contingency that are worth distinguishing and, 
contrary to initial expectations, contingency is no more readily admissible in any of these senses on 
a capacities (i.e. Cartwright and Pemberton powers) account of laws than on those that take laws as 
strong unifying regularities (BSA), as relations among universals, or as facts about dispositions of 
the Alexander Bird style (or as the metaphysically necessary facts about regularities that follow 
from these). All these equally can, but need not, allow laws to be both permissive and limited in 
extent. 
 
The second surprise is reliability. We use this label to pick out a view easy to say in plain 
English but hard to make precise, that the laws of nature may remain the laws they are, the correct 
laws, and yet be ‘violated’ or broken in their own domain. Violation – unreliability in our terms – 
fares badly on all accounts, except surprisingly, a David-Lewis style best systems account, 
supposing we are willing to make an adjustment either to the notion of violation or to the BSA 
itself, where the adjustments rely heavily on a notion of ‘almost true’. Under the soft determinism 
wiggle, though it is dressed up in the possibly impressive-looking quasi-formal language of possible 
worlds, the final verdict is that the correct laws are never violated in the strong sense. If something 
seemingly untoward happens (e.g. God intervenes), this can be a violation of some ‘almost true’ 
laws that prohibit it but not of the correct laws.  The laws-as-templates wiggle gives up on the 
precise truth of the correct law claims: the regular associations that constitute the laws do not really 
hold; they only ‘almost’ hold. 
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This is surprising in the context of much current discussion of ‘compatibilism’ in 
metaphysics– Is an interventionist God/free will compatible with deterministic law? – which seems 
to suppose the BSA. If we are right that reliability is unavoidable on the other accounts but could 
perhaps fail on the BSA, then this literature is focused on the easiest case for avoiding reliability. 
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